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against local authorities or quangos (including applications by one such authority 
against another) “public law proceedings”. But we are already becoming used to the 
idea that a different line has to be cut through the supervisory jurisdiction to defi ne 
those decisions made by “public authorities” for the purposes of the Human Rights 
Act 1998. A point of greater pressure may develop, however, where the question of the 
mandatory character of judicial review arises.54 Although the logic of the distinctive 
character of the supervisory jurisdiction may already have demanded that all proceed-
ings for interdict which appear to be within the realm of judicial review rather than 
ordinary “civil proceedings” should indeed be routed towards judicial review, this has 
not been clear in all cases.55 The decision in Davidson may now require that that 
consequential clarity should also be achieved. There may otherwise be the risk that 
remedies against the Crown may be denied because the proceedings in which they 
were sought were not directed to the supervisory jurisdiction.
Chris Himsworth
Professor of Administrative Law
University of Edinburgh
54 See C M G Himsworth, “Judicial review in Scotland”, in M Supperstone, J Goudie and P Walker (eds), 
Judicial Review, 3rd edn (2005), 659-660.
55 See, e.g., Bell v Fiddes 1996 SLT 51.
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54 See C M G Himsworth, “Judicial review in Scotland”, in M Supperstone, J Goudie and P Walker (eds), 
Judicial Review, 3rd edn (2005), 659-660.
55 See, e.g., Bell v Fiddes 1996 SLT 51.
Just an Expert Group That Can’t Say No: 
Reforming Corporate Homicide Law
The recent Expert Group Report on Corporate Homicide1 stems from the 2003 
decision in Transco plc v HM Advocate,2 where the appeal court held that a charge 
of culpable homicide could not be levelled against a corporate body without alleging 
the an individual (or perhaps individuals acting collectively), who could be identifi ed 
as the “directing mind and will” of the corporation, possessed the mens rea required 
for the offence.
That outcome, which largely aligned Scots law with English law in adopting the 
“identifi cation principle”3 as the basis for corporate criminal liability (at least where 
culpable homicide was alleged) was recognised as having the consequence that 
“complex organisations cannot in practice be prosecuted for culpable homicide”.4 In 
due course, the Justice Minister established an Expert Group on corporate homicide 
in April 2005, the Group’s remit being “to review the law in Scotland on corporate
1 Scottish Executive, Corporate Homicide: Expert Group Report (2004) (henceforth Report) (available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/11/14133559/35592).
2 2004 JC 29. See J Chalmers, “Corporate culpable homicide: Transco plc v HM Advocate” (2004) 8 
EdinLR 262; P W Ferguson, “Corporate culpable homicide” 2004 SLT (News) 97.
3 Tesco Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153.
4 Report, para 2.7.
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liability for culpable homicide and to submit a report to the Minister for Justice by 
the summer, taking into account the proposals recently published by the Home Secre-
tary”.5 The Group’s Report was published in November 2005 and was understood to 
be under consideration by the Minister at the time this note was written.
A. WHY LEGISLATE?
Although Transco successfully argued that the charge of culpable homicide levelled 
against it was irrelevant, it did not escape prosecution as a result. The indictment 
against it included an alternative charge of a contravention of sections 3 and 33(1) of 
the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, which resulted in a conviction and a fi ne of 
£15 million being imposed.6
If a company can be punished this severely for a breach of the 1974 Act, it might 
be doubted whether corporate homicide legislation is required. The Group rejects this 
argument, arguing that health and safety offences “are seen by the public as being of 
lesser severity than offences prosecuted under the common law of culpable homicide” 
and that prosecutions for such offences would not meet the “public demand for 
justice”, or provide as strong a deterrent as a new offence.7
One problem is that the structure of the 1974 Act seems to offend against the 
principle of “fair labelling”.8 The label attached to the offence does not necessarily 
refl ect the harm done: the fact of a death is merely part of the factual narrative rather 
than being relevant to guilt.9 It might, of course, be responded that it is unfair to label 
a corporate body as being liable for a death that it did not foresee, but that is not a 
leniency afforded to natural persons, who may be liable for culpable homicide and 
analogous road traffi c offences without any need to prove foresight of death.10 Further-
more, despite the large fi ne imposed on Transco, it might be argued that the penalties 
imposed on corporations who cause deaths are often inadequate – either because the 
“regulatory” nature of the offence leads courts to impose overly lenient penalties, or 
because of the limited range of sanctions available under current  legislation.
There is – although the Group does not discuss it – an argument that continuing 
to rely on health and safety legislation alone might result in a breach of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The relevant case is Öneryildiz v Turkey,11 which 
5 Report, para 1.1. The Home Secretary’s proposals are found in Corporate Manslaughter: The Govern-
ment’s Draft Bill for Reform (Cm 6497, 2005).
6 Report, para 2.2. Fines of up to £10million had previously been imposed in a small number of cases: 
House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, Draft Corporate Manslaughter 
Bill (HC 540-I, 2005), para 266.
7 Report, para 5.3.
8 On which see A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 4th edn (2003), 89-92.
9 As Gobert and Punch note, “[r]esults are simply irrelevant to the determination of whether a company 
has committed a regulatory offence”: J Gobert and M Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (2003), 131. 
That does not mean, of course, that they are irrelevant to the decision to prosecute or on the appropriate 
sentence following conviction.
10 In respect of culpable homicide, see, for example, Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 1994) 1996 JC 76. 
The road traffi c offences are causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving 
when under the infl uence of drink or drugs: ss 1 and 3A of the Road Traffi c Act 1998, as amended.
11 (2004) 39 EHRR 12. I am grateful to Fiona Leverick for drawing this case to my attention.
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arose out of an explosion at a landfi ll site which resulted in thirty-nine deaths. Two 
local mayors were prosecuted for offences of “negligence in the performance of their 
duties”,12 and minimal penalties were imposed.13
The applicant, who had lost nine members of his family, claimed inter alia that 
Article 2 of the Convention (the right to life) had been breached in those circum-
stances. In upholding this claim, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated 
that Article 2 requires “a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to 
the identifi cation and punishment of those responsible for the death and the putting in 
place of effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against 
the person…”14 In all the circumstances, even though the court of fi rst instance had 
referred to the deaths in its judgment as a factual element in the case,15 the court 
concluded that “the criminal law remedy, as used in the present case, cannot be 
regarded as adequate and effective”.16
Öneryildiz probably cannot be taken as calling into doubt the proceedings in the 
prosecution of Transco itself. The deaths involved in that case, although technically 
not part of the statutory charge against Transco, were nevertheless libelled in the 
indictment, while the Öneryildiz court laid stress on the minimal sanctions involved in 
that case,17 which is not a criticism applicable to the Transco prosecution. Other cases, 
however, may involve much lower penalties,18 and there is at least a stateable case that 
the combination of a criminal offence under the 1974 Act with a relatively low penalty 
is insuffi cient to meet the requirements of the Convention.
B. THE REPORT
The most striking feature of the Report is the Group’s disinclination to rule out 
any possible law reform proposal which it considered. Almost all the proposals it 
con sidered are supported (if sometimes by a majority), or at least left open for further 
consideration. Just about the only possibility the Group rules out is modifying the 
existing common law offence of culpable homicide: if this were done, “an oppor-
tunity would be missed to set out on the fact of statute a clear and unambiguous 
offence”.19 In proposing that a new statutory offence be created, however, the Group 
12 Öneryildiz, at [106].
13 The court imposed the minimum prison sentence of three months and a fi ne of 160,000 Turkish lire 
on each defendant, but then (a) commuted the sentence to fi nes (resulting in penalties of 610,000 lire) 
and (b) suspended enforcement of the fi nes on the basis that it was satisfi ed the defendants would not 
reoffend. See Öneryildiz, at [33].
14 Öneryildiz, at [91].
15 Öneryildiz, at [107].
16 Öneryildiz, at [111].
17 Öneryildiz, at [107]. See, however, A Gerry, “Case comment: Öneryildiz v Turkey” [2005] EHRLR 203, 
212, who reaches a stronger conclusion: “[w]here loss of life has occurred in cases where negligence goes 
beyond error of judgment or carelessness, criminal proceedings under specifi c offences recognising the 
loss of life appear to be what Art 2 requires.”
18 See Health and Safety Executive, Health and Safety Offences and Penalties 2004/2005 (2005), table 8 
(noting that across the UK, the average penalty per conviction for a work-related fatality was £29,867 in 
2004/2005 (provisional fi gures)).
19 Report, para 5.2.
ELR10_2_05_Analysis.indd   292 25/4/06   19:34:02
293analysisVol 10 2006
is not prepared to rule out the alternative possibility of reforming health and safety 
legislation to create an offence of causing death through dangerous conduct: “there 
might be advantage” in reforming health and safety legislation at the same time as 
creating a new offence.20
Elsewhere, the Group shies away from ruling anything out. On the key issue of 
capturing corporate fault – how is it to be decided when a corporation is to be blamed 
for a death? – the Group identifi es three obvious options: (i) an objective “reckless-
ness” standard; (ii) a “management failure” approach; and (iii) strict liability subject to 
a due diligence defence. Now, choosing between these options is a diffi cult task. The 
Group’s solution is diffi cult to follow: in summarising their proposals, they state that 
the new offence should have all three.21
This note will return to that particular problem in due course,22 but fi rst the other 
proposals considered by the Group should be recorded: (i) a stand alone offence for 
individuals – exactly which individuals is not clear, although there is a reference to 
“directors/managers”23 – which would involve a lower standard of fault than the general 
law of culpable homicide (favoured by a majority);24 (ii) art and part liability for the 
new offence of corporate homicide (favoured);25 (iii) a specifi c secondary offence for 
“directors/senior managers” (favoured by “most of the Group”);26 (iv) expanding the 
proposed new offence to cover non-fatal serious injury (“further consideration should 
be given to it”);27 (v) applying the new offence to unincorporated bodies despite their 
lack of legal personality (apparently favoured);28 (vi) applying the new offence extra-
territorially (favoured “on balance”),29 and (vii) removing Crown immunity in respect 
of the new offence (favoured).30
Finally, the Group’s enthusiasm reaches its zenith when the Report turns to 
consider the issue of penalties. During the Group’s deliberations, one of its members 
agreed to produce a paper on possible penalties for corporate homicide. That paper 
was submitted in due course and outlined a wide range of possible sanctions: monetary 
fi nes, equity fi nes, disqualifi cation orders, dissolution orders, corporate probation, 
punitive injunctions, community service orders, publicity orders and requiring a senior 
20 Report, para 5.3. The Report does not discuss how this might be achieved given that the relevant parts 
of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 are reserved matters and so outwith the competence of 
the Scottish Parliament: Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5, Part II, H2.
21 Report, para 11.1.
22 See below, section C.
23 Report, para 12.1.
24 Report, para 12.3.
25 Report, para 12.6.
26 Report, para 12.6.
27 Report, para 13.4.
28 Report, para 13.6. The Report does not state clearly whether this option is favoured or not, stating that 
a majority of the group recognise that it may involve “practical diffi culties” and going on to state that 
these are “not insuperable”, although there is no explanation of how they would be overcome.
29 Report, para 13.8.
30 Report, para 14.3. Here again, the Report is not entirely clear: it states that the removal of Crown immu-
nity “should be more extensive” than proposed under Home Offi ce proposals, but does not state how 
much more extensive.
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offi cer of the company to attend sentencing.31 Rather than expressing any concluded 
view on the relative merits of these options, or deciding that any of them might be 
inappropriate, the Group’s response was to agree to attach the paper as an annex to 
the Report32 and conclude “that providing a suite of possible penalties would provide 
the courts with the fl exibility to respond to the many and various circumstances of the 
cases which may come before them”.33
C. CAPTURING CORPORATE FAULT
The most important aspect of the proposals is the Group’s proposed model of corpo-
rate fault, which seems peculiar at fi rst glance. The Group starts by considering the 
defi nition of recklessness offered by the Draft Criminal Code for Scotland, which 
is modelled on an “obvious or serious risk” of which the actor “is, or ought to be, 
aware”.34 There are, of course, serious problems with such an approach – a judge 
or juror may well be able to make an informed decision on whether, for example, a 
motorist should have been aware of an “obvious or serious” risk arising from his or her 
driving, but how is that same individual supposed to determine what (say) a complex 
multinational corporation “ought” to have been aware of? Nevertheless, an objective 
defi nition of recklessness bypasses the Transco problem by removing “awareness of 
risk” from the equation, meaning that it would no longer be necessary to show that a 
particular individual possessed the mens rea of corporate homicide.
At this point, however, the Group’s proposals become diffi cult to follow. For some 
reason, the Group seems to consider that objective recklessness is an element of actus 
reus,35 and proposes that “the physical element of the offence should be one of an 
employee or agent of the organisation causing death through recklessness”.36 The acts 
of employees or agents could be “aggregated” for this purpose.
Both aggregation and recklessness, however, are unnecessary complications in this 
context. If the core of the offence is a failure by the management: as the Group puts it, 
a failure “to put policies, practices and systems in place to ensure the health and safety 
of its employees and those affected by its activities”,37 then there should be no need to 
aggregate any activities, nor to show that the particular individuals were “reckless”. It 
31 H Croall, “Penalties for corporate homicide: paper prepared for the Scottish expert group on corporate 
homicide August 17th 2005”, reproduced as Annex B to the Report.
32 Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Expert Group on Corporate Homicide (Tues 23 Aug 2005), para 
30 (at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/criminal/Corporate/4thset).
33 Report, para 15.4.
34 E Clive, P Ferguson, C Gane and A McCall Smith, A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with Commen-
tary (2003), 32-33 (available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/cp_criminal_code.pdf).
35 The Group appears to have been misled by a comparison with the offence of causing death by dangerous 
driving, which it considered to be a strict liability offence despite the requirement that “it would be obvi-
ous to a competent and careful driver” that the accused’s driving was dangerous (Report, para 9.2 et seq). 
As Michael Christie has pointed out, however, the argument that dangerous driving does not require 
mens rea is simply “based on the opinion that negligence is not a matter of mens rea” (GH Gordon, The 
Criminal Law of Scotland, 3rd edn by M G A Christie (2001), para 30.08). Whether this requirement is 
described as mens rea or not, it nevertheless represents the fault element of the offence.
36 Report, para 11.1. 
37 Report, para 11.1.
ELR10_2_05_Analysis.indd   294 25/4/06   19:34:02
295analysisVol 10 2006
should suffi ce simply to show that the “management failure” caused the death. That, 
however, gives rise to the same problem noted above: how is “management failure” 
sensibly to be assessed?
The Group goes on to suggest that “a due diligence defence would be available to 
an organisation if they could demonstrate that they had all reasonable policies, systems 
and procedures in place, which should have prevented the offence taking place”.38 
This would be an odd addition to a requirement of “management failure”: if that had 
been proven by the Crown, how could a company possibly succeed in making out this 
defence? It seems, however, that what the Group has in mind is a simple reversal of 
the burden of proof:39 where a death occurs, it would be for the corporation to prove 
that there had not been a management failure, rather than for the Crown to prove 
that there had been.
Reverse burdens of proof are, of course, common throughout the criminal law, 
particularly in “regulatory” offences.40 But to suggest that a reverse burden should be 
imposed in respect of an offence as serious as homicide is unprecedented.41 There is 
much to be said for the argument that it is unjust that corporations are not in practice 
subject to the law of homicide in the same way as individuals, and that reform should 
be taken to eliminate this discrepancy so far as possible. But if corporations are to be 
treated as severely as individuals, they must also be entitled to the same protections as 
individuals, and it is diffi cult to see why they should be subject to the law of homicide 
but not entitled to the full benefi t of the presumption of innocence in that regard.
Such an approach gives rise to obvious human rights objections, but the Group 
sees it as no function of its own to consider those, saying only that “there are potential 
human rights issues associated with reverse burdens of proof which would have to 
be considered carefully”.42 Nor does the Group seek to justify reversing the burden 
of proof, doing no more than asserting it as the “preferred approach”. This is wholly 
inadequate in human rights terms: in order to show that a reverse onus is compatible 
with the presumption of innocence, it must be shown inter alia that the reversal serves 
a legitimate aim and is proportionate to that aim.43 If the Group is not prepared to 
articulate its own arguments to address these points, how is any resultant provision 
to be defended in court? It is regrettable that the Group is prepared (both here and 
elsewhere) simply to assert support for various law reform proposals without putting 
forward arguments in their favour.
38 Report, para 11.1.
39 Report, para 10.6.
40 A Ashworth and M Blake, “The presumption of innocence in English criminal law” [1996] Crim LR 
306.
41 An accused who pleads insanity or diminished responsibility in such a case must make out the plea on the 
balance of probabilities (for recent discussion, see the Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility 
(Scot Law Com No 195, 2004), part 5). But in such cases, the prosecution must still prove both the actus 
reus and mens rea of the crime in order to secure a conviction.
42 Report, para 10.6.
43 I Dennis, “Reverse onuses and the presumption of innocence: in search of principle” [2005] Crim LR 
901, 905.
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D. A TERRIBLE FIX?
There are a number of further problems with the Group’s Report which will present 
considerable diffi culty in moving towards legislation. First, the Group’s approach to 
the various options it considered, and its reluctance to rule anything out, presents 
political diffi culties for the Executive in considering the Report. Almost any legisla-
tion the Executive brings forward now runs the risk of being portrayed as a “watering 
down” of the Group’s proposals. There is no reason why this should be the case: much 
of the Report simply leaves matters open for further consideration, or fails entirely 
to explain how the proposals would operate (how, for example, are bodies which lack 
legal personality to be prosecuted and sanctioned for corporate homicide?) It must 
be recognised that the Group’s Report does not contain a set of proposals which the 
Executive can simply either adopt or reject.
Secondly, the Group is too quick to dismiss the argument that individuals may 
be deterred from taking up senior posts in organisations by the spectre of individual 
liability, or that corporate bodies may avoid locating in Scotland due to fears about 
corporate homicide legislation. The Group’s response is simply that “good managers 
would not be deterred” by such liability.44 That may be true, but even the most consci-
entious of managers may be deterred by legislative proposals if they fear that they may 
operate in an arbitrary and unjust fashion. If the Group had explained exactly how it 
envisaged individual liability would work, it might be easier to convince persons in that 
position that they had “nothing to fear”, but as it is no such line of argument is possible. 
In advancing towards corporate homicide legislation, it may not be realistic to expect 
the Executive to secure the enthusiastic support of the commercial sector. Neverthe-
less, the Executive has an obligation to engage fully with that sector in the process.
Thirdly, it is regrettable that the Group does not discuss in any detail the interface 
between health and safety legislation and its proposed new offence. There is a strong 
case for saying that if a company is not in breach of any safety regulation, and could 
not be convicted of a health and safety offence, there should be no basis for convicting 
it of an offence of homicide; and conversely, that if the corporate body is in breach 
of health and safety law, there should be no need to waste court time considering 
whether “management failure” (or whatever test must be satisfi ed for an offence of 
corporate homicide) has been made out.45
Fourthly, the Group’s approach to sentencing is unhelpful. In England and Wales, 
the government has estimated that its proposed new offence of corporate manslaughter 
will attract no more than fi ve prosecutions per year, although that assumption has 
been challenged by some bodies.46 If that is a reasonable estimate, prosecutions are 
likely to be even rarer in Scotland, meaning that it will take some considerable time 
44 Report, para 12.8. Or, as one member of the Group has put it: “the innocent have nothing to fear”. D 
Whyte, “Getting away with homicide” 2005 SCOLAG 170, 174.
45 P R Glazebrook, “A better way of convicting businesses of avoidable deaths and injuries?” (2002) 61 CLJ 
405, 417. The Group does note the suggestion of the Centre for Corporate Accountability that “manage-
ment failure”, for the purposes of the new offence, could be defi ned as including “gross breaches of 
specifi ed statutory duties, in particular those under sections 2 to 6 of the Health and Safety at Work 
Act.”: Report, para 5.4.
46 House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, Draft Corporate Manslaughter 
Bill (HC 540-I, 2005), ch 12.
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for the judiciary to build up any expertise in sentencing corporations. Offering up an 
enormously wide-ranging “suite of penalties” without further guidance would simply 
pass the parcel back to the judges and dodge the diffi cult question of how exactly 
corporate bodies should be sanctioned.
Part of the problem here is the manner in which this review exercise has been 
carried out. The Law Society member of the Group asked at its fi rst meeting “whether 
the Group could access the Executive’s Central Research Unit, or external providers 
who could undertake a literature review”, receiving the response that it “was doubtful 
that this would be possible within existing timescales and resources”.47 As a conse-
quence, the Report contains next to nothing by way of reference to either the vast 
literature on corporate liability for crime, and only passing reference to – rather than 
analysis of – legislation and law reform proposals in other jurisdictions.
The Report has, of course, emerged in a much shorter timescale than would have 
been expected if (for example) the review had been carried out by the Scottish Law 
Commission,48 but that is not an advantage. A Commission report could have been 
expected to produce a much more detailed analysis and proposals more ready for 
transposition into legislation. More importantly, the two-stage nature of a Commis-
sion review, involving a discussion paper being put out to consultation, would have 
led to the proposals being substantially refi ned by the time of a fi nal report.49 As it 
is, the Report is a limited exercise which leaves most of the diffi cult questions in this 
area unresolved. Legislative reform is likely to be a long process: in England, the Law 
Commission issued a consultation paper addressing the topic in 1994,50 and legislation 
has still not been enacted. The Group’s Report is merely a fi rst step.
James Chalmers
School of Law
University of Aberdeen
47 Minutes of the First Meeting of the Expert Group on Corporate Homicide (Fri 6 May 2005), para 30 
(at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/criminal/Corporate/minsfi rstmeeting).
48 Referring the issue to the Commission would not have been an option for the Executive given that the 
Commission was already engaged with its review of rape and other sexual offences: see Rape and Other 
Sexual Offences (Scot Law Com DP No 131, 2006).
49 Compare, for example, the changes made between the discussion paper and the report in the Commis-
sion’s project on the age of criminal responsibility: Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scot Law Com DP 
No 115, 2001); Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scot Law Com No 185, 2002).
50 Criminal Law: Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com CP No 135, 1994).
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